Open Letter to Joe Torre

11/17/07
Welcome Joe,

As you assume your new duties you are getting all sorts of advice from the Media, as well as those within the Dodger organization. I think its important that you also get advice from the fans, particularly Senior Fans. I am a Dodger fan who was crushed by Bobby Thompson’s home run, was the only fan in my neighborhood that was percipient enough to order World Series tickets in 1959, who enjoyed the Walter O’Malley years, and who has lived in agony for the past thirty years as the Dodgers pursued the same failed strategy again and again and again.

One person that you should listen to in the Dodger organization is pitcher Joe Beimel. He was recently quoted as saying that what the Dodgers need is to have some veteran players to give guidance to the younger players so that they will learn what to do. This is valuable advice because it is so purely and perfectly wrong!

This is exactly what the Dodgers should not do. We know this because they repeatedly ran tests over the past several years and proved that that is a losing strategy.

The best illustration of the current situation on the Dodgers is to look closely at what was going on in the 2006 season when they lost 13 out of 14 games, and then won 17 out of the next 18 games during July and August. There was much speculation about how such a thing could occur. The simple answer is found by looking at who was playing and who was missing during that time span. The significant factor was that Jeff Kent and Nomar Garciaparra were both out of the lineup with injuries for most of that period. Kent missed 18 games, and Garciaparra missed 13.

The athletic capabilities of the two players could have contributed somewhat to the odd change of fortune. It’s never a bad thing to have someone other than Kent playing defense at second base, and Garciaparra was settling back into his expected batting average after a miraculous first half of the season.

The most significant factor, though, was that they could not be the “team leaders”, as they had been anointed by the Dodger organization and the media, when they weren’t there. What happened during that period was that the team became Andre Ethier’s and Russell Martin’s team. When Wilson Betemit and James Loney joined the team, they had every right to think that they had just as much responsibility for the team’s success as anyone else, because the stars of the team were people their own age that they had played with or against in the minors.

There had been a de facto “changing of the guard”, and the Dodgers were transformed from a team of formerly great players acquired from other teams with a few rookies trying desperately to get enough playing time to be noticed, to a team of rising young stars with a few veterans playing out the string. The stage was set for the Dodgers to complete the transformation by replacing Lofton and Drew with players like Kemp and Repko. Had they done so, the team that was leading the division on August 15 would have added to their lead, and been a formidable post season contender.

The pusillanimous Dodgers, though, did not do that. As soon as the expensive Kent and Garciaparra were healthy they were returned to the lineup, and the rest is bitter, humiliating, history.

After the 2006 season, the Dodgers compounded their problem by acquiring Juan Pierre and Luis Gonzales.

Juan Pierre turned out to have a miraculous season, for him, offensively. He barely missed hitting .300, and was a decided asset in running the bases. Unfortunately, he gave back as much defensively as he contributed offensively. A double by an opposing player, if hit to center field, was an automatic triple. No opposing player ever so much as slowed down at second, knowing as they did that if the ball was in Pierre’s hands it would not reach the cutoff man without bouncing twice. The idea of Pierre’s trying to throw directly to third base was absurd. Such a throw would have to take a ballistic trajectory of 45°, and would arrive long after the runner had finished dusting off his pants.

Even though Pierre had a better offensive season than could have reasonably been expected, the Dodgers did not get nearly as much, offensively, out of the center field position as they could have. Matt Kemp had 292 at bats during the 2007 season. Juan Pierre had 668. If the Dodgers had never signed Pierre, and had played Kemp in center field every game, they would have had 12 more runs, 34 more hits, 3 more doubles, 3 more triples, 23 more home runs, 123 more total bases, and 55 more RBIs.

Defensively, Kemp has canon for an arm. Nobody ever challenged him when he was in right field. Pierre is fast, but Kemp is faster, picks up the ball better, and has surer hands.

As to Luis Gonzales, even he was surprised that he was playing every day, keeping either Ethier or Kemp on the bench. He, too, had a much better season than could have reasonably have been expected, offensively, but the same analysis applied to him would show that the Dodgers also did not get as much out of the left field position as they could have, either offensively or defensively.

Furthermore, even these analyses do not tell the whole story about how much the Dodgers lost by playing players based upon their salaries, rather than upon their on-field performance. A careful look at James Loney’s year in 2007 shows why. Loney dazzled the baseball world in spring training, only to be sent to Las Vegas when the season started, in order to make room on the roster for Pierre and Gonzales. It was only when Garciaparra was injured that he was recalled.

It was not his first time up, but it was the first time that he was the only option at first base. He played everyday. Playing everyday improved his performance enough that, when Garciaparra’s health improved enough that he could play, he was moved to third base, because Loney was obviously a potential gold glove winner at first base.

That was when Loney really took off. Now the position was his. He had beaten out the competition. Now, when he came to the ballpark, he only had to accomplish one thing. That was to beat the other team. This is what made him, and Russell Martin, different than Ethier and Kemp. Ethier and Kemp had two things to worry about – beating the other team and getting playing time. It’s easy to say that accomplishing the first will assure accomplishing the second, but that is just not true when the Manager is beholden to the General Manager for his job. If the Manager plays Matt Kemp and lets the player that the General Manager wowed the media by acquiring in the off season sit on the bench, the Manager is likely to lose his job. That is because, if playing the less expensive player is successful, and the high priced off-season acquisition sits the rest of the season, then the owner is likely to fire the General Manager, for having wasted a bunch of his money.

Yogi Berra said that half the game is ninety per cent mental. This is what he was talking about. Half the game is physical ability. The other half is playing with confidence. If a young player at bat is thinking “I need to get a hit to score the runner on base”, but is also thinking “If I don’t get a hit the Manager is going to decide that I’m not very good, and I’ll be benched or sent down”, then he is not going to have the confidence that enables him to pull the trigger when the right pitch comes in, or to swing with fluid abandon when he does swing. His mental state needs to be “I’m playing because I’m a proven major leaguer, and nobody is going to judge me on the basis of this next pitch”.

Once Loney had established his permanent position as the first baseman for the Los Angeles Dodgers, he became phenomenal. In September, he out performed Matt Holliday of the Rockies, who was himself having a phenomenal month.

The difference was that Holliday was playing amidst an entire team of young, talented players, each of whom had the mental attitude that he was as integral to the success of the Rockies as any other player. There were no expensive players, who had accumulated huge statistics over the course of many seasons, and who had been acquired during the off season to “lead” the Rockies to the pennant. There were only peers, none intimidating, and all supportive. The only veteran was Todd Helton, but he had not been “brought in to lead”, but was there because he still had enough ability left to be able to play with these rising young stars.

Thus, the models I hope you will have for the Dodgers of 2008 and beyond are the 2007 Rockies and the 1973 Dodgers.

In 1973 the Dodgers brought up and installed as starters Steve Garvey, Ron Cey, Davey Lopes, Bill Russell, and Bill Buckner. They weren’t brought up as bench warmers, with the idea that they would learn to be Major Leaguers by watching some “real” players play. They were brought up to continue doing what they had been doing in the minors – play well, while playing every day. They did that, and that produced the most successful decade in Dodger history.

The whole secret to success in bringing up young players is continuing to have them play everyday after they are brought up. Vin Scully, whom I revere, ruminated during a game last season that Andy LaRoche was struggling at the plate. He noted that he had hit .343 at Las Vegas, but commented that that was the difference between the majors and the minors. In this instance, I beg to differ with Vinny. The difference is not the difference between the majors and the minors, but the difference between playing every day and playing once in a while! Almost all players play in the minors, and usually how they play there is indicative of how they will play when they are established major leaguers. The players that they will play against in the major leagues are the same players that they played against in the minor leagues.

It is obvious that nobody fields the third base position better than Andy LaRoche. We watched Beltre play there during his last season with the Dodgers, and Beltre won the Gold Glove at that position then, and again this season, but I would not choose Beltre over LaRoche at this point in their careers, because so much more of LaRoche’s career is ahead of him!

Therefore the last thing the Dodgers are in desperate need of is a third baseman. Granted, bringing in Alex Rodriguez would not be like bringing in Juan Pierre, Luis Gonzalez, Marquis Grissom, J.D. Drew, Nomar Garciaparra, or Jeff Kent, from the standpoint of physical ability to play the game. Although he is well past the peak of his ability, he is by no means washed up. But there is the other factor to consider. That is the anti-Joe Beimal factor. This Dodger team does not need some Senior Citizen to “lead” them. They don’t need someone that the Dodger management, the media, and the players themselves will look to to get things accomplished.

The young players on the Dodgers need to each look to himself to be the person that will get the job done. We don’t need any “Backbenchers” mentally waiting for a superstar to be the one that ignites the rally, drives in the winning run, or takes a hit away from the other team at the crucial time.

So, how are the Dodgers set to field a team next season?

First, the easy ones:

Catcher – Russell Martin, the all star catcher.

First Base – James Loney. Acknowledged to be the best fielding First Baseman in Dodger history. Hit .331 for the 2007 season, but hit nearly .400 after he had relegated Garciaparra to third base or the bench. Showed good home run power after he was established.

Third Base – Andy LaRoche. Fantastic fielder. Makes the Shortstop job easy, while also covering the line, and making the off balance throw on a bunt or topped dribbler up the third base line. Hit .343 at Las Vegas, where he played everyday, and is showing power in the off season play against Japan.

Left Field – Andre Ethier. Excellent fielder, with a strong arm, good anticipation, and alertness. Came to the Dodgers from Oakland, where he was regarded as the future of the franchise. Arrived with the mental set that Oakland had made a huge mistake, and that he was going to make something of the Dodgers. At the time, injuries gave him the opportunity to play everyday, which he expected to do, anyway, and it seemed for a long time that his average would never fall below .400. As he was given to understand that he would not be playing everyday, that that privilege was reserved for old, old, players making many times as many dollars as he was making, and that he was not the savior of the team, but just a bit player that would play now and then, his average ebbed downward until he was tentative at the plate and his average dropped below .300. Bat this guy cleanup!

Center Field – Jason Repko. The fastest outfielder. Great arm. Willingness to get any ball (sometimes to his detriment when walls get in the way). Has always hit well over .300 when he plays every day. As long as he is healthy, he is better than anyone.

Right Field – Matt Kemp. Faster than anyone except probably Repko. Terrific arm – already has the league convinced not to challenge him. Good speed for base running, once he learns where the third base coach is, and that he will always get good advice from the third base coach. Offensively he hit .342, to lead the Dodgers, with good power, and his speed produces doubles and triples. All of this he did as a sometimes player. Play him everyday and he will show the same degree of improvement that Loney did after he was secure in his position on the team.

Shortstop and Second Base – to be determined in Spring Training. There are only two positions for four players:

Raphael Furcal. When he’s healthy, which he never was in 2007, he can field the position like no one else in the game. You should ask Loney if he thinks he could get a hit off of Furcal’s fast ball if Furcal was pitching, because I don’t think a thrown baseball ever moves faster than Furcal’s throw to first. Furcal isn’t a switch hitter. He only bats that way. He hits 100 points higher from the right side than he does from the left side. Statistically, the advantage that a right handed batter, when batting against a left handed pitcher, over batting against a right handed pitcher is only .012 or .014 (See The Righty-Lefty Factor in Baseball in this blog). Therefore, Furcal should always bat right handed. Granted, he will hit 12 to 14 points less against right handed pitching than he does against left handed pitching, but that is far better than hitting 100 points less. Forget about power. If he has 400 at bats against right handers, and hits 100 points higher against them, that’s 40 more hits, and some of them will land on the other side of the fence.

Chin-lung Hu. Spectacular fielder. Hit .337 at Las Vegas when he played everyday. If Furcal continues his health problems, or refuses to bat right against right handed pitchers, then Hu looks like he could do the job, if it was given to him unconditionally.

Toni Abreu. Is a switch hitter. Hit .355 at Las Vegas when playing every day. Hit .385 from one side and .343 from the other. It still would be advisable to hit from the .385 side all the time, but switching isn’t unreasonable. Great fielder. Takes hits away from the other team.

Delwyn Young. Switch hits, but hits .421 against right handers and only .333 against left handers. He hit .382 with the Dodgers, when only playing sporadically, and most times not even a complete game. Great fielder. The important thing about Delwyn Young is that he must play somewhere on the Dodgers! He is the insurance against either Repko or Furcal not being able to answer the call physically in 2008. This doesn’t mean he should be a utility player. It just means that all players will have to earn what positions are left in Spring 2008, after Delwyn Young occupies one position. If all three outfielders are healthy, and Martin, Loney and LaRoche are healthy, then Delwyn Young will have to be at Second or Short and there will be three candidates for the other infield position.

Once you have made your decision about who will play each position, get 162 lineup cards engraved and dated, ready to present to the home plate umpire at the beginning of each game. John Wooden ran an exhaustive test at UCLA and proved that you will be the champion at the end of the season every year simply by playing the same set of players, every game, all game, all year. He showed that the single most important thing in winning games is for each player to be absolutely secure in his position, and absolutely aware of his responsibility for winning the game. That factor far outweighs whatever other considerations might be taken into account. Once you decide on who your eight position players are, who your injury or absence substitute for the infield and for the outfield is, put all lineup decisions behind you until the following spring training.

You will notice that there is no mention of Jeff Kent, or Wilson Valdez. Valdez is omitted purely on the basis of age. With so many excellent young players available, there is little point in devoting a position to the thirty year old Valdez, even though he virtually carried the team in the early part of the 2007 season, and is always sparkling in every aspect of the game. He should be carried as the utility man that teams sometimes need. He has demonstrated that he can fill that role.

Jeff Kent is not mentioned because, in addition to being ancient, he is not a good ball player, or a good team mate. He either has never had the physical capability to play second base on a Major League level, or he has never taken the time to study the position. He came to the Dodgers at a time when Alex Cora had been playing in Second Base, so the fans knew how well the position could be played. Not only was Cora blessed with innate speed, agility, and a strong arm, but he knew more about where the ball would be hit, or how a play would develop than anyone who ever played the game. He averaged, over the course of a season, four “takes” for every three games. A “take” is a batted ball that would have resulted in a hit if hit in the vicinity of the average fielder, but resulted in an out when hit to the extraordinary fielder.

Jeff Kent may average a “take” per season, but not more. He makes his share of errors, never acknowledges them, and just doesn’t make an adequate attempt at many balls hit between first and second. He is similarly sloppy and unaware in his base running, and, again, never behaves as though he was at fault when he contributes to an early end to a Dodgers offensive inning.

Jeff Kent has an impressive list of hitting accomplishments, and may, indeed, some day be in the Hall of Fame, but he is, on balance, not an asset to any team. If he wishes to continue playing, he should do it as a designated hitter in the American League.

I will make just a few comments about pitching. Saito is an unexpected miracle. He is somewhat old, but pitchers, unlike position players, can sometimes continue to be effective after they are thirty. The ace of the staff is Chad Billingsley, who has responded to a long stay in the starting rotation by improving with almost every outing. Eric Stults has been dominating in most of his infrequent starts, but never got two starts in a row, as there were pitchers that had been acquired from teams that were willing to part with them that had to be used in order to not show up the General Manager.

Hong-Chih Kuo has looked the most like a major league pitcher, and has usually been effective, but because of injuries, as well as fearfulness on the part of the manager, has not been used consistently. Don’t let them take this pitcher away from you.

None of the rest of the staff should be untouchable if really good young pitchers are available on the market.

Now, how should you use the clout you have as a four time World Series winner? I have referred, above, to the problem of the Manager working for the General Manager. If the General Manager makes a silly, and expensive, trade, normally the Manager has to live with it. That expensive player has to play every day, or the Manager is likely to be fired by the General Manager. Thus Grady Little could not leave Pierre, Gonzalez, Garciaparra, or Kent on the bench when he had better players on the roster that had come up from the minors.

You, however, are not in that position. You truly are the tail that can wag the dog. If things don’t work out, you are not the one that is going to be fired, at least not for several years. The owner, the media and the fans are united in believing that you are the real deal. Therefore, you are in a position to keep your eyes on the field and make your lineup based on how the players are performing, regardless of how much they are being paid.

This should be the most fun a manager ever had. Just imagine. You will be competing in a division that already has two teams built from the ground up, with players from within the system, and you have the best system behind you. For thirty years the Dodgers mode of operation was to maintain the best farm system in baseball, nurture young players up to the major league level, and then trade them to other teams for aged players that some other team was willing to part with.

The Dodgers, during this thirty year span, have been a General Manager dominated organization. This has been great for the local media, because, with no baseball history before 1958, the media has never developed anyone with a real appreciation of the game. They can only perceive the broadest strokes, such as blockbuster deals. They have no inkling about the fact that an airtight defense can have a greater effect on winning percentage than how many balls fall on the other side of outfield fences.

The Dodgers had a General Manager for several years whose crowning achievement was acquiring three players from other teams so that he would have a first baseman and a third baseman that went to the same college, at the same time that he had a left fielder and a right fielder that went to the same high school! How cute was that?

Now that silliness is all behind us. You have the clout and the young players to reestablish the Dodgers as the preeminent teams in baseball.